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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case

Charles W. Houpt and Gail N. Houpt, husband and wife ("Houpts"), appeal from a district
court judgment dismissing their claims for equitable relief and wrongful foreclosure of a deed of
trust against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and First American Title Company ("Wells Fargo" and
"FATCO" and collectively, "Wells"). Houpts argue the court erred by ruling against them on
motions for summary judgment and reconsideration and awarding attorney fees to Wells.
B.

Course Of Proceedings

1.

Pleadings

Houpts, grantors of a deed of trust in favor of American Bank of Commerce as beneficiary
and FATCO as trustee, filed a Verified Complaint on June 22, 2012, praying for the following relief:
(a) judgment declaring Wells Fargo is not the beneficiary of the deed of trust; (b) judgment enjoining
a trustee's sale which scheduled for July 17, 2012; and (c) damages for slander of title. R. Vol. I,
pp. 18-19. Houpts also moved for a preliminary injunction to stay the foreclosure. Id., pp. 34-35.
Wells Fargo filed a Verified Answer on July 13, 2012, asserting it owned the beneficial
interest in the deed of trust and raising defenses including judicial estoppel, waiver, unclean hands,
and lack of standing. Id., pp. 64-71. FATCO filed a similar Answer. R. Vol. II, pp. 276-81.

2.

Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order

Houpts' motion for preliminary injunction was heard on September 4, 2012. Ruling from
the bench, the district court made oral findings of fact, including the following: (a) Wells Fargo had
purchased the deed of trust and the promissory note it secured ("the Note") in 2004, and was still the
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Note holder and beneficiary, Tr. p. 87, LL. 1-8, p. 92, LL. 4-12; (b) Houpts had defaulted on the
Note, Tr. p. 87, LL. 14-15; (c) Houpts filed a bankruptcy petition in February 2011, Id., L.18; and
(d) The real property encumbered by the deed of trust ("the Property") was still owned by Houpts'
bankruptcy estate. Id., p. 95, LL. 13-15. It denied Houpts' motion on grounds they lacked sufficient
interest in the Property to enjoin the trustee's sale, and were estopped from denying Wells Fargo was
their creditor:
[Houpts] previously accepted the position that Wells Fargo Bank was
their secured creditor, . . . [and] received the benefits of that
transaction, and it would now be inconsistent to allow [Houpts] to
maintain a position that Wells Fargo bank is not the holder, the owner
of the note and entitled to foreclose.
Id. p. 96, LL. 11-18; p. 98, LL. 3-6.

3.

Stipulation for Voluntary Sale, Interpleader and Intervention

At Houpts' request, Wells postponed the trustee's sale for several months to give Houpts an
opportunity to sell the Property voluntarily. Houpts listed the Property and found a buyer. In June
2013, the parties filed a stipulation to accommodate the sale and deposit the proceeds thereof with
the clerk. R. Vol. II, pp. 300-05. The district court accepted the stipulation, which also permitted
three other creditors with liens in the Property to intervene to have their rights adjudicated. Id., pp.
273-75. The other creditors (not parties to this appeal) intervened and asserted their rights in the
proceeds. Id., pp. 282-99.

4.

Cross-motions for Summary Judgment

Wells moved for summary judgment in September 2013, Id., p. 306, arguing that Houpts'
claims failed because Wells Fargo was the beneficiary of record; and the amount and priority of
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Wells Fargo's lien entitled it to all of the net sale proceeds. Id., pp. 322-27. Wells Fargo established
the amount of its lien by affidavit. Id. at pp. 335, 354. Houpts filed a cross-motion for partial
summary judgment in November 2013, arguing their theory ofrecovery was wrongful foreclosure,
not slander of title. R. Vol. III, pp. 442,465. They also argued the balance of the Note presented
a triable issue. Id., pp. 461-63. In reply, Wells argued Houpts' wrongful foreclosure claim failed
as a matter oflaw because no foreclosure was completed, Houpts lacked standing, and the claim was
barred by judicial estoppel. R. Vol. IV, pp. 666-75.
On January 7, 2014, the district court ruled that Houpts' equitable claims were moot because
Wells Fargo had recorded a written assignment of the beneficiary's interest in the deed of trust and
because Houpts had voluntarily sold the Property in the interim. Id., p. 756. It further ruled that
Houpts could not maintain a wrongful foreclosure action because the trustee's sale was canceled.
Id., p. 761. The court also concluded there was a triable issue of fact "whether the Intervenors were
good faith purchasers ... whose conveyances were recorded prior to [Wells Fargo's]." Id., p. 765.

5.

Cross-motions for Reconsideration

Houpts and Wells filed cross-motions for reconsideration later that month. Houpts argued
Wells Fargo violated Idaho Code § 6-101 and could not obtain a judgment against them. Id., pp.
779-80. Wells Fargo acknowledged it was not seeking to enforce the Note against Houpts as they
had discharged their personal liability in bankruptcy. It also argued § 6-101 did not apply to its
nonjudicial foreclosure, Id., pp. 786-87, and that as an assignee, Wells Fargo held the rights of the
original beneficiary, notwithstanding the attachment of other liens in the interim. R. Vol. V, p. 83 7.
Wells also asked for a ruling on the issues of judicial estoppel and standing. Id., p. 859.
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On those motions, the district court held that judicial estoppel prevented Houpts from
pursuing their claims which they failed to schedule as assets in their bankrnptcy proceeding. Id., p.
862. It also ruled that Wells Fargo's lien had priority over the interests ofHoupts and the intervening
creditors. Id., p. 867. Finally, the court ordered the proceeds from the sale of the Property to be paid
to Wells Fargo because the amount of its lien exceeded the amount of the proceeds. Id.

6.

Costs

The court awarded costs including attorney fees to Wells as a contractual right and entered
judgment against Houpts in the amount of the cost award. Id., pp. 1041, 1055.

C.

Statement Of Facts

In March 1993, Houpts obtained an SBA-guaranteed loan from American Bank of Commerce
("ABC"), to make improvements to the Property, a parcel in Bonneville County, Idaho where Houpts
operated a pet and feed store. R. Vol. II, p. 330, ,r 2, Vol. III, p. 479, ,r,r 3-4. The loan was evidenced
by the Note, originally dated March 8, 1993 and modified March 31, 1993 in the principal amount
of $327,800.00, having a maturity date of March 8, 2013. R. Vol. II, pp. 337-40. The Note was
secured by a first position deed of trust against the Property and a second position deed of trust
against Houpts' residence, granted in favor of FATCO as trustee and ABC as beneficiary. R. Vol.
I, p. 200-02, Vol. II, pp. 330-31; Vol. III, p. 479, ,r,r 5.
Through a series of mergers, ABC became Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A.. R. Vol. I,
pp. 67, 195, ,r 3. In 2004, Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A. sold most of its assets and liabilities,
including the Note and deeds of trust, to Wells Fargo. Id. No written assignment of the deeds of
trust was recorded at that time. Id.
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Houpts defaulted on the loan in 2005, then cured their default in 2006 by refinancing their
home and reducing the balance of the loan by $100,000.00. As part of that transaction, Wells Fargo
released its deed of trust against Houpts' residence. R. Vol. I, pp. 195-96, ,r,r 6-8, Exhibits B, C.
Houpts defaulted again in 2007 by missing several monthly payments, and they made no
payments after November 2009. R. Vol. I, pp. 196, 212-13, R. Vol. II, p. 332. Houpts also failed
to pay taxes on the Property. Id. As a consequence, in October 2010, Wells Fargo directed FATCO
to foreclose. FA TCO recorded a notice of default which identified ABC as the original beneficiary
but did not refer to the mergers or the assignment to Wells Fargo. Id., R. Vol. III, pp. 520-21.
To stop the foreclosure, Houpts filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in February 2011. R.
Vol. II, p. 216, ,r 2. They were represented by counsel throughout the bankruptcy proceedings. R.
Vol. I, p. 17 5, ,r 1. Houpts filed bankruptcy schedules on February 16, 2011 and amended schedules
on April 1, 2011, neither of which disclosed any contingent or unliquidated claims of value. R. Vol.
IV, pp. 681-683. Houpts converted the bankruptcy to a Chapter 13 case but they were unable to
confirm a plan ofreorganization and the case was converted back to a Chapter 7 proceeding on the
motion of the Chapter 13 Trustee. R. Vol. II, pp. 234-36. Houpts ultimately discharged $365,669.39
in debt and their bankruptcy case was closed on September 25, 2013. R. Vol. IV, pp. 688-689.
In the interim, Wells Fargo obtained stay relief and resumed foreclosure. R. Vol. I, p. 148,

,r,r 2-3.

On March 5, 2012, FATCO recorded an amended notice of default which identified Wells

Fargo as the current beneficiary. R. Vol. I, p. 3 3. On September 4, 2012, Wells Fargo recorded a
notice that the deed of trust had been assigned to it by Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A. in 2004.

R. Vol. III, p. 526,

,r 9, pp. 602-04.
5

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Did the district court properly dismiss Houpts' equitable claims as moot?

2.

Did the district court act within its discretion when it ruled Houpts are judicially

estopped from pursuing a claim for damages which they failed to disclose in their bankruptcy case?
3.

Do Houpts also lack standing as real parties in interest to prosecute their claim in

damages because that claim belongs to their bankruptcy trustee?
4.

Did the district court act within its discretion in determining that Wells prevailed?

5.

Wells is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§

12-120(3) and 12-121, and the terms of the Note and deed of trust.
ARGUMENT

A.

Standards Of Review
1.

This Court reviews the district court's findings of fact for
clear error and exercises free review over the district court's
conclusions of/aw.

Because no jury trial was requested and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment
on the same evidentiary facts, the district court expressly exercised its power, under Riverside
Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657 (1°982), to draw what it considered the
most probable inferences from the uncontroverted facts. R Vol. IV, p. 754, Vol. V, p. 853. "In such
instances, the appropriate standard of review on appeal is equivalent to the standard of clear error
prescribed by I.R.C.P. 52(a)." Farm Bureau Ins. Co. ofldaho v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho 415,418,234
P.3d 739, 742 (2010). This Court exercises free review over the district court's conclusions oflaw.
Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486,489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006).
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2.

The dismissal of Houpt 's claims on the basis ofjudicial
estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration, this Court uses the same
standard applied by the trial court. If the decision was within the trial court's discretion, this Court
applies an abuse of discretion standard. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103,
113 (2012). A dismissal of claims on the basis of judicial estoppel is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,252, 92 P.3d 492,502 (2004). This Court therefore asks
whether the lower court: (1) rightly perceived the decision to apply judicial estoppel as discretionary;
(2) acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable
to specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. Mccallister
v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891,894,303 P.3d 578,581 (2013).

3.

The district court's determination ofprevailing party status
is also reviewed for abuse ofdiscretion.

"The determination of prevailing party status is committed to the sound discretion of the
district court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion." Oakes v. Boise Heart
Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540,542,272 P.3d 512, 515 (2012); I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B).

B.

Houpts' Equitable Claims Were Properly Dismissed As Moot.
1.

The district court 'sfindings that Wells Fargo was the
beneficiary's assignee and Houpts sold the Property
are supported by substantial, undisputed evidence.

Under the Ritchie standard, this Court examines the record to determine whether the district
court's decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. ofldaho
v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho at 418,234 P.3d at 742. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact
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would accept and rely on it. Northwest Farm Credit Servs., FLCA v. Lake Cascade Airpark, LLC,
156 Idaho 758, 763-64, 331 P.3d 500, 505-06 (2014). The district court's findings are to be liberally
construed in favor of the judgment entered. E.g., Stibal v. Fano, 157 Idaho 428, 337 P.3d 587, 591
(2014). This Court does not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Ransom v.
Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641,643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006).
Exercising the Ritchie Power, the district court found that the notice of the assignment of the
deed of trust to Wells Fargo was recorded on September 4, 2012. R. Vol. IV, p. 756. That finding
is undisputed and is supported by evidence submitted by Houpts. R. Vol. III, p. 526, 19, pp. 602-04.
The district court also found that Houpts voluntarily sold the Property. R. Vol. IV, pp. 754, 756.
That finding is also supported by the parties' stipulation, R. Vol. II, pp. 300-05, the court's order
accepting the stipulation, Id., pp. 273-75, the intervention ofHoupts' other secured creditors, Id., pp.
282-99, and the reimbursement to Wells Fargo for property taxes it had paid. Id., p 332, 1 16.
Houpts do not challenge these findings. Indeed, they acknowledge the date Wells Fargo's
assignment was recorded and do not dispute that they voluntarily sold the Property. Appellants'
Brief at pp. 7-8, 22-23. Houpts argue the district court erred in not considering other evidence, Id.
at 21, but do not explain how that evidence creates a triable issue. In any event, this Court does not
replace the trial court's findings of fact by reweighing the evidence. Idaho Dep't of Health &
Welfare, Mental Health Servs. v. Doe, 157 Idaho 274,335 P.3d 614,619 (Ct. App. 2014), review
denied (Oct. 23, 2014). Houpts have therefore failed to prove error in the district court's findings
of fact.
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2.

The district court's findings support its conclusion that
Houpts' equitable claims are moot.

Based on its findings, the district court ruled that Houpts' claims for equitable relief had
become moot. R. Vol. IV, p. 756. An claim becomes moot if it no longer presents a real and
substantial controversy capable of being concluded through judicial decree of specific relief.
Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 851, 119 P.3d 624, 626
(2005). A claim on appeal is moot when an appellant no longer has a legal interest in the outcome.
State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 682, 99 P.3d 1069, 1072 (2004) (citing Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S.
478, 481-82 (1982).
More specifically, equitable claims arising out of the plaintiffs ownership of real property
become moot when the property is sold to a third party .

.l1&., Evans v. Family Sav. & Loan Ass'n,

481 A.2d 1309, 1310 (D.C.1984) (affirming dismissal of a claim to enjoin a foreclosure because the
purchase of the property by a third party divested appellant of any interest in the property); Fields
v. Millsap & Singer, P.C., 295 S.W.3d 567,570 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (dismissing as moot plaintiffs'
appeal of summary judgment against them on quiet title and rescission claims).
Here, Houpts' claims arose out of their ownership of the Property and relied upon an
averment that Wells Fargo was not the beneficiary ofrecord. Upon the recording of the assignment
and Houpts' sale of the Property, those claims became moot as a matter oflaw. The district court's
dismissal of Houpts' equitable claims should therefore be affirmed.
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C.

Dismissal Of Houpts' Wrongful Foreclosure Claim Was Also Proper.

I.

The district court's findings that Houpts were in
default and no foreclosure was completed are
supported by substantial, undisputed evidence.

The district court found that Houpts defaulted on the Note. Tr. p. 87, LL. 14-15. That
finding is supported by the affidavit testimony of Wells Fargo's loan officer. R. Vol. I, pp. 196, 21213, Vol. II, p. 332, ,i,i 13-14. The court further found that no foreclosure was completed because
Houpts sold the Property. R. Vol. IV, pp. 749-750. That finding is also supported by substantial
evidence, as discussed above. R. Vol. II, pp. 273-75, 282-99, 300-05, 332, ,i 16. Houpts do not
challenge those findings. Rather, they argue there is a question of fact as to whether they were in
default, without citing any evidence in the record which could create a triable issue. Appellants'
Brief at 21. They are essentially asking this Court to reweigh the evidence and second guess the
district court's findings, which it will not do. Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402, 408, 34 P.3d
1085, 1091 (2001). Because the district court's findings are supported by substantial, competent
evidence, they are not clearly erroneous and should not be set aside on appeal.

2.

The district court's findings support its conclusion that
Houpts' claim/or damages fails as a matter of law.

Except for Georgia, every jurisdiction to have considered the issue has rejected wrongful
attempted foreclosure as a theoryofrecovery. E.,g,_, Subramaniam v. Beal, No. 3: 12-cv-01681-MO,
2013 WL 5462339, *3 (D.Or., Sept. 27, 2013):
Oregon recognizes a cause of action for the wrongful foreclosure of
a trust deed ... only where the foreclosure has actually occurred. Ms.
Subramaniam's claim . . . is moot because her house was not
foreclosed upon. Because no foreclosure occurred, there is no
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controversy about whether it was fraudulent or wrongful, and the
court cannot provide any relief. Oregon does not recognize a cause
of action for wrongful attempted foreclosure, so Ms. Subramaniam's
allegation that a potentially wrongful foreclosure was threatened or
attempted does not give rise to a cause of action.
See also Edwards v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 24 F. Supp. 3d 21, 31 (D.D.C. 2014)(holding no
claim for wrongful foreclosure exists where the grantor voluntarily sells his property); Vawter v.
Quality Loan Serv. Corp. of Wash., 707 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1123 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Rosenfeld v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 952,961 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (affirming dismissal of a
wrongful foreclosure claim where "there is no dispute that a foreclosure sale did not take place");
55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 451 ("There is no cause of action for an attempted wrongful
foreclosure"). In Georgia, the claim is recognized only as one for slander of title.

U, Bates v.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 768 F.3d 1126, 1134 (11th Cir. 2014) ("the plaintiff must prove a
knowing and intentional publication of untrue and derogatory information concerning the debtor's
financial condition, and that damages were sustained as a direct result of this publication").
The district court concluded Houpts cannot pursue a claim for wrongful attempted
foreclosure "where such a cause of action is not allowed by law." R. Vol. IV, p. 761. Houpts argue
the court erred but do not cite any authority which supports their theory of recovery. The four cases
Houpts do cite are inapposite.
In Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp.v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 P.3d 429 (2006), the
purchaser at a trustee's sale ("Freddie Mac") brought an ejectment action against the grantor (Appel).
The district court granted Freddie Mac's motion for summary judgment. Appel appealed, arguing
that the rescheduled trustee's sale (which had been postponed by Appel's bankruptcy) was not
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properly noticed. The issues on appeal were (a) whether the district court had relied on the correct
notice statute in granting summary judgment to Freddie Mac, and (b) whether Freddie Mac was a
good faith purchaser for value regardless of whether the notice requirements were satisfied. This
Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded for further fact finding. 143 Idaho at 47, 137
P.3d at 434. Appel is inapposite because here, no trustee's sale ever occurred.
Houpts' reliance on Arabia v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 678 (Cal.
App. 2012) and Schroeder v. Excelsior Management Group, LLC, 297 P.3d 677 (Wash. 2013) is
similarly misplaced. Neither case recognizes a claim for wrongful attempted foreclosure. The court
in Arabia affirmed a summary judgment in judicial foreclosure in favor of a loan servicer, rejecting
the grantor's argument that the servicer lacked standing. 208 Cal. App. 4th at 477. The court in
Schroeder held that a Washington statute requiring deeds of trust against agricultural land to be
foreclosed judicially cannot be waived by contract. It vacated the dismissal of the grantor's statutory
claim for damages and remanded for a determination whether the property was agricultural. 297
P .3d at 687. The one case Houpts quote is an inapposite, unreported opinion issued by the California
Court of Appeal, which that court expressly designated as noncitable. Appellants' Brief at 19.
Even if Idaho were to follow Georgia, Houpts cannot prevail on appeal. They failed to
produce evidence on summary judgment or allege in their Complaint that their loan was not in
default when the foreclosure commenced. ,E&, Aetna Fin. Co. v. Culpepper, 320 S.E.2d 228,232
(Ga. App. 1984) (holding a claim for wrongful attempted foreclosure failed where plaintiff neither
alleged nor proved any special damages arising from a false publication). Regardless of the standard
of review, Houpts have failed to demonstrate reversible error by the district court.
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D.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Applying
Judicial Estoppel To Bar Houpts' Claim For Damages.

Judicial estoppel bars bankrupts from asserting claims which they omitted from their
bankruptcy schedules. See, e.g., Eastman v. Union Pac. R. Co., 493 F.3d 1151, 1159 (10 th Cir. 2007)
(noting that the "overwhelming majority of cases" apply judicial estoppel in such circumstances);
Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, 453 F.3d 446,448 (7 th Cir. 2006) ("All six courts that have considered this
question hold that a debtor in bankruptcy who denies owning an asset, including a chose in action
or other legal claim, cannot realize on that concealed asset after the bankruptcy ends"); Payless
Wholesale Distrib., Inc. v. Alberto Culver (P.R.) Inc., 989 F.2d 570, 571 (1 st Cir. 1993) ("Conceal
your claims; get rid of your creditors on the cheap, and start over with a bundle ofrights. This is a
palpable fraud that the court will not tolerate."); Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d
778, 782-86 (9th Cir.2001 ); In re Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d 197, 208 (5th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 1117 (2000) (holding that a debtor is barred from bringing claims not disclosed in its
schedules).
Idaho courts follow the majority rule. Mowrey v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 155 Idaho 629,
634, 315 P .3d 817, 822 (2013) (holding there is no "good faith" exception to judicial estoppel even
if debtors were ignorant of disclosure requirements in bankruptcy and their legal counsel failed
them); McCallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho at 897,303 P.3d at 900 (2013) ("very clear and very heavy
authority hold[ s] that judicial estoppel will apply to interests not disclosed in a prior bankruptcy");
A & J Const. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682,688, 116 P.3d 12, 18 (2005).
The district court, perceiving the matter as one of discretion, found McCallister to be
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dispositive:
The Houpts had knowledge of their action against [Wells Fargo] at
least by the time they filed their Verified Complaint on June 22, 2012.
The Houpts had sufficient opportunity to amend their asset schedules
... prior to the closing of the bankruptcy case. As noted by the court
in McCallister, it is immaterial whether Houpts intended to conceal
the claim. Because the Houpts knew of their claim prior to the close
of the bankruptcy case, they are now judicially estopped from
pursuing this litigation.
R. Vol. V, pp. 853, 862. The district court thus acted within the boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the standards set forth in McCallister, and reached its decision by an exercise of
reason.
Houpts argue McCallister is distinguishable and the district court erred in following it.
There, the plaintiff (Doherty) filed a malpractice suit against his physician (Dixon), alleging Dixon's
negligence nearly two years earlier had caused Doherty to lose an eye. In the interim, Doherty had
filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. Doherty did not disclose his claim against Dixon in his
bankruptcy schedules prior to receiving his discharge.
On summary judgment, Dixon raised Doherty's failure to disclose his claim in bankruptcy.
Doherty responded by reopening his bankruptcy case, amending his schedules to list the lawsuit as
an asset, and joining his chapter 13 trustee (McCallister) as a party plaintiff. Doherty argued his
failure to disclose the lawsuit was a good-faith mistake which he had cured. The district court was
not persuaded and ruled judicial estoppel barred Doherty's claim against Dixon.
McCallister appealed, arguing a good faith exception to judicial estoppel applied because
Doherty did not intend to conceal the lawsuit. This Court unanimously affirmed, holding that "the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it properly recognized judicial estoppel as applicable
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to situations of non-disclosure of an asset in an earlier bankruptcy proceeding." 154 Idaho at 89 5,
3 03 P .3d at 582. The Court noted that Doherty' s subjective intent was immaterial: "Judicial estoppel
'takes into account ... what the [estopped] party knew, or should have known.'" Id. (quoting Heinze
v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232,236, 178 P.3d 597,601 (2008)). Specifically, with reference to bankruptcy
debtors, the Court stated, "Judicial estoppel will be imposed when the debtor has knowledge of
enough facts to know that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of the bankruptcy,
but fails to amend his schedules or disclosure statements to identify the cause of action as a
contingent asset." Id. (quoting Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.
2002)).
Houpts contend McCallister is distinguishable because, unlike Doherty, Houpts were not
aware of their claims against Wells when they filed their bankruptcy petition. However, "the duty
to disclose all assets and potential assets continues after the initial filing since a debtor is required
to amend his or her financial statements if circumstances change." Wood, 141 Idaho 682 at 684, 116
P.3d at 14. See also Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 785 (a debtor's duty to disclose potential claims
continues for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding); Hay v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell,
978 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying judicial estoppel to bar claims of a bankrupt plaintiff
where he learned of the facts giving rise to his claims before the bankruptcy case was closed). Thus,
Houpts rely on a distinction which makes no difference.
The district court also cited Mowrey in its decision. R. Vol. V, p. 862. Mowrey was issued
after the parties' summary judgment memoranda were filed. It is more factually similar than
McCallisterto this case but is even less helpful to Houpts' argument. There, the plaintiff(Mowrey)
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was injured at a Chevron facility in June 2005 in the course of his employment.

He was

incapacitated and suffered a loss of income as a result of his injuries, leading Mowrey and his wife
to file a prose Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in September 2005. The attorney who prepared their
petition and schedules was later disbarred. The schedules did not disclose any claim against
Chevron. The Mowreys received a discharge of their debts in December 2005.
In June 2006 the Mowreys' trustee reopened their bankruptcy estate to administer a tax
refund. In July 2006 -

upon advice of a representative from the State Insurance Fund -

the

Mowreys retained an attorney who informed them of their potential claims against Chevron.
However, the Mowreys did not thereafter amend their schedules. Their bankruptcy case was closed
again in May 2007. Six weeks later, the Mowreys filed a complaint against Chevron.
In January 2011, Chevron moved for summary judgment, arguing the Mowreys' claim was
barred by judicial estoppel. In response, the Mowreys reopened their bankruptcy case, amended their
schedules, and filed affidavits stating: (a) they had no knowledge of their claim against Chevron
when they filed their bankruptcy petition; (b) they were unaware the claim needed to be disclosed
in bankruptcy; and (c) they did not intentionally conceal it from the bankruptcy court. The district
court granted Chevron's motion and denied the Mowrey's motion for reconsideration, finding that
judicial estoppel was warranted by the Mowreys' knowledge of and failure to disclose their claim.
The Mowreys advanced several arguments on appeal, none of which can be made by Houpts
in this case. They argued: (a) their failure to list the claim as an asset was an unintentional oversight
by pro se debtors; (b) judicial estoppel did not apply because Chevron was not a creditor or party
related to their bankruptcy; (c) judicial estoppel should not apply because it would preclude
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Mowreys' creditors from recovering; and (d) Mowreys had cured their non-disclosure.
This Court again unanimously affirmed. It held the Mowreys were charged with knowledge
of their claim against Chevron during the pendency of their bankruptcy and therefore "possessed the
requisite knowledge for the application of judicial estoppel." 155 Idaho at 634, 315 P.3d 821.
Mowrey is indistinguishable. Its holding illustrates that if the district court there acted within
the bounds of its discretion, then the district court here certainly did as well.
The Mowreys acted pro se in their bankruptcy and argued their omission was the result of
their ignorance. Houpts, on the other hand, were represented by counsel. They cannot escape
judicial estoppel by blaming their bankruptcy attorney. See Mc Callister, 154 Idaho at 898, 303 P .3d
585 ("Following the advice of counsel is not the equivalent of inadvertence or mistake"); Eastman,
493 F.3d at 1159 (plaintiff's "assertion that he simply did not know better and his attorney 'blew it'
is insufficient to withstand application of the doctrine").
Chevron was not Mowreys' creditor and fortuitously avoided liability for Mr. Mowrey's
injuries, (as did Dixon in McCallister), to the detriment of the Mowrey's bankruptcy creditors. Here,
Wells Fargo was Houpts' creditor. It is not using estoppel to escape tort liability as Chevron and
Dixon did. Rather, it prevailed at summary judgment on other grounds. Thus Houpts' bankruptcy
creditors are not harmed by this result.
The Mowreys didn't file their complaint against Chevron until after their bankruptcy was
closed, requiring the courts to infer when the Mowreys' had sufficient knowledge of their claim to
warrant judicial estoppel. Houpts filed their complaint over a year before their bankruptcy case
closed. The district court did not rely on inference: "The Houpts had knowledge of their action ..
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. by the time they filed their Verified Complaint . . . . The Houpts had sufficient opportunity to
amend their asset schedules . . . . Because the Houpts knew of their claim prior to the close of the
bankruptcy case, they are now judicially estopped from pursuing this litigation." R. Vol. V, p. 862.
Finally, Mowreys at least attempted to cure their nondisclosure and argued that they were
seeking to recover for the benefit of their creditors. Houpts have made no such attempt or argument.
Moreover, Houpts contend that if they were to defeat Wells Fargo's lien, "the proceeds [of the
voluntary sale] should in fact be distributed to them." Appellants' Brief at p. 28, L. 2.
Here, as in McCallister and Mowrey, Houpts' knowledge of and failure to disclose their
claim warranted the imposition ofjudicial estoppel. Houpts have failed to prove any error-let alone
an abuse of discretion-in the dismissal of their claims for damages.
E.

The District Court's Grant Of Summary Judgment Can Be Affirmed On
The Alternative Ground That Houpts Lack Standing As The Real Party
In Interest.

This Court may uphold decisions on alternate grounds from those stated by the district court
on summary judgment. E.,_g,_, Shapley v. Centurion Life Ins. Co., 154 Idaho 875, 882, 303 P.3d 234,
241 (2013)(citingMartelv.Bulotti, 138Idaho451,453,65P.3d 192, 194(2003)). In Mowrey.this
Court also affirmed on grounds the Mowreys were not the real party in interest:
[T]his cause of action arose from an accident that occurred before the
Mowreys filed bankruptcy, and the Mowreys had knowledge of this
asset during the pendency of their bankruptcy. Thus, this claim
became an asset of the bankruptcy estate, and it was a claim for the
bankruptcy trustee alone to assert. . .. Therefore, since the Mowreys
were not a real party in interest, and since the bankruptcy trustee was
never a party to this case, the district court did not err in dismissing
this case on the basis that the Mowreys were not the real parties in
interest ....
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155 Idaho at 635,315 P.3d at 823. See also McCallister, 154 Idaho at 898,303 P.3d at 585:
Property that is not disclosed on the asset schedule, or otherwise
administered by the time the bankruptcy case closes, remains property
of the bankruptcy estate forever. . . . The trustee of the bankruptcy
estate is the only party with standing to prosecute causes of action
belonging to the estate."
(internal citations omitted).
Here, the Houpts admit:
On June 22, 2012, Houpts filed their Complaint requesting
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, arising out of a
non-judicial Deed of Trust foreclosure (DOT sale) initiated by
[Wells]. The Houpts were in bankruptcy at that time ....
Appellants' Brief at 6 (internal citations omitted). This admission is consistent with the district
court's findings:
[Wells Fargo] first initiated foreclosure proceedings on October 18,
2010. The Houpts filed their bankruptcy schedules and amended
schedules on February 16, 2011 and April 1, 2011. Neither schedule
declared any contingent or unliquidated claims of value. On March
15, 2012, [Wells Fargo] re-initiated foreclosure proceedings after the
bankruptcy court granted it stay relief. The Houpts filed the Verified
Complaint in this action on June 2, 2012. The bankruptcy case was
not closed until September 25, 2013.
R. Vol. V, p. 862. Once Houpts filed their bankruptcy petition, any existing claim for damages
became an asset ofHoupts' bankruptcy estate which only their trustee could assert. While the trustee
did abandon the Property, R. Vol. 3, p. 301, 19, at no time did he abandon Houpts' unscheduled,
contingent, unliquidated claims against Wells. Those claims therefore remain property ofHoupts'
bankruptcy estate and this Court may also affirm on grounds Houpts are not the real party in interest.
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F.

The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Awarding Attorney
Fees To Wells.
I.

The court did not err in determining that Wells prevailed
because Wells obtained the most favorable result available to
a defendant.

A defendant is the prevailing party as a matter of law when he obtains dismissal of the
complaint with prejudice and the plaintiff takes nothing thereby. Daisy Mfg Co., Inc. v. Paintball
Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 262, 999 P .2d 914, 917 (Ct. App.2000) (overruled on other grounds,
BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers Inc., 149 Idaho 294,233 P.3d 1216 (2010)). There, this
Court reversed a trial court's denial of an award of attorney fees to the defendant after a stipulated
dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. It held that dismissal with prejudice, where the plaintiff
gains no benefit from the litigation, is "the most favorable outcome that could possibly be achieved"
by a defendant. It concluded:
Although the prevailing party determination is discretionary in nature,
this discretion must be exercised within the bounds of governing legal
standards. Under some circumstances application of these standards
requires a holding that one party is the prevailing party on a particular
claim as a matter of law. This is such a case, for application of the
Rule 54(d)(l )(B) factors can lead only to a conclusion that Paintball
was the prevailing party.
Id. (citing Holmes v. Holmes, 125 Idaho 784,874 P.2d 595 (Ct. App. 1994)).
The district court perceived this issue as one of discretion. R. Vol. V, p. 103 7. It acted
within the boundaries of its discretion and within the standard set forth in Paintball Sports:
Houpts Complaint was dismissed in its entirety .... Pursuant to [the
parties'] stipulation, this Court ordered that all proceeds should be
distributed to [Wells Fargo]. [Wells Fargo] is the prevailing party, as
against the Houpts.
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Similarly, all claims against FATCO have been dismissed.
F ATCO could not have received a better outcome. FATCO is also a
prevailing party, as against the Houpts.

Id pp. 1037-38. The court reached its decision by an exercise ofreason, as it elected to apply and
follow Paintball Sports. The district court did not abuse its discretion and its prevailing party
determination should not be disturbed on appeal.

2.

The court acted within its discretion in determining the
amount of attorney fees to award because it considered and
applied the factors in lR.C.P. 54(e)(3).

Attorney fees may be awarded only when provided for by contract or by statute. LR.C.P.
54(e)(l); Hellarv. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571,682 P.2d 524 (1984). The amount of the award rests
in the sound discretion of the court and the burden is on the disputing party to show an abuse of
discretion in the award. Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 659, 651 P.2d 923, 924 (1982).
"Where issues of discretion are involved, an award of attorney fees is proper if the appellant fails to
make a cogent challenge to the judge's exercise of discretion." Andrews v. Idaho Forest Indus., Inc.,
117 Idaho 195, 197, 786 P.2d 586, 589 (Ct. App. 1990).
This action arose out of a commercial loan agreement. The loan documents provide that
Houpts will pay their lender's reasonable attorney fees in the event of a lawsuit. R II, pp. 339, 347,

18(c ). The district court relied on those provisions as the basis for a fee award, R. Vol. V, pp. 871,
1041, though it could have also relied upon Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). In determining the award
amount, the court acted within its discretion and in accordance with applicable legal standards by
twice applying the factors listed in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3). Id. at pp. 872-74, 1043-45. The court reached
its decisions by an exercise ofreason. Id. at 1045.
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Houpts argue the district court erred but cite no case authority or any Rule 54(e)(3) factors
other than "time and labor required" in support. Appellants' Brief at 37. Houpts suggest all of
Wells' attorney fees were incurred enforcing the loan documents and thus the "amount involved"
(Rule 54(e)(3)(G)) was limited to the principal balance of the Note. Id.; R. Vol. V, p. 936. That
argument fails to account for fees incurred in defending four separate causes of action, including
claims for damages whichHoupts valued between$590,000.00 and$725,000.00, R. Vol. V,pp. 958,
960, and a threatened claim for punitive damages. R. Vol. III, p. 470, n. 11. Houpts have not made
a cogent challenge to the district court's exercise of discretion. Accordingly, Wells ask this Court
to affirm the fee award.

G.

Wells Fargo And FATCO Are Entitled To Attorney Fees On Appeal.

The loan documents provide a basis for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party
on appeal. R. Vol. II, pp. 339, 347, ,r 8(c). Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) provides an alternate basis.
~ ' Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980,342 P.3d 907,914 (2015) ("Idaho Code section 12-120(3)
generally mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial").
Reasonable attorney fees may also be awarded to the respondent under§ 12-121 if the Court
determines that the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.
Turnerv. Turner, 155 Idaho 819,827,317 P.3d 716, 724 (2013) (holding the statute authorizes a fee
award where the appellant "failed to develop an argument, offered scarce citation to authority, and
ignored the aspects of the law unfavorable to him"). See also Chicoine v. Bignall, 127 Idaho 225,
228, 899 P .2d 43 8, 441 (1995) (awarding fees because "the law in this area is very clear" and
appellant presented no cogent argument as to why that law does not apply to him).
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In both Mowrey and McCallister this Court declined to award attorney fees to the respondent
because the appellant raised an issue which was previously unsettled in Idaho:
In McCallister ... this Court declined to grant attorney fees on appeal
because "[the plaintiff] made a good faith argument that his omission
was not intentional and therefore fell within the ambit of the
inadvertence-or-mistake exception. Since this issue is unsettled in
Idaho and other courts have addressed this exception in terms of
intentionality, attorney fees will not be awarded." 154 Idaho at
899-900, 303 P.3d at 586-87. In the present matter the Mowreys
make the same argument. Because their appeal and briefing was
filed with the Court before this Court's decision in McCallister,
the Mowrey's appeal was supported by a good faith legal
argument. Thus, neither party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
155 Idaho at 635, 315 P.3d at 823 (emphasis supplied).
The issues raised by Houpts have been settled. Houpts' attempt to distinguish McCallister
ignores its holding and the "very clear and very heavy authority," 154 Idaho at 900,303 P.3d at 587,
which preceded it. Houpts do not make a cogent or good faith argument why McCallister does not
apply. Houpts do not even address Mowrey, nor do they argue their omissions in bankruptcy were
the result of inadvertence or mistake. To the contrary, they acknowledge the choice not to amend
their bankruptcy schedules has been a deliberate one. R. Vol. V, p. 1008, ,r 5.
Houpts contend the district court erred in applying judicial estoppel but do not argue that it
abused its discretion or cite any authority which would support a different result. Nor do Houpts cite
any authority in support of their arguments that the district court lacked jurisdiction, their equitable
claims are not moot, or that Idaho courts recognize a cause of action for unlawful commencement
of a foreclosure. Rather, Houpts rely solely on the argument that there was conflicting evidence
presented below to supp01i their claims. Attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-121 are
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appropriate where the appeal simply invites this Court "to second-guess the trial court on conflicting
evidence." Turner, 155 Idaho at 827,317 P.3d at 724 (quoting Hoggv. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549,559,
130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006). That is what Houpts have done here. Accordingly, Wells are entitled
to attorney fees on appeal.

CONCLUSION
The district court correctly identified and applied the standards for adjudicating Houpts'
claims on cross motions for summary judgment and for reconsideration, and in applying judicial
estoppel. Its decisions therefore should be affirmed.
Dated this 29 th day of April 2015.

----

PERRY LAW, P.C.
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By: Trevor L. Hart - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants - Respondents
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